1000000031

19 6

l'vI

E T A P

n y s

nothin¡:: hut

lite

p!'r~('ption

of the: agreement or dif;tgrce–

ment

our

;d~.IJ.

and demonHr.Hion nothing

bU I

lhe

pcr~(plion

fu eh

:lgrcement

lhe intervelltion of'

other

;:I~nJ .

Oll r

1Hoot!

id:nJ,

:lS wel! as

tJI.11!JOIlf1ticol,

bt-i n1!

arc¡'c l)ptJ

themrdves ,

and

adcq\late or

cComplete

i–

dr'.lI.

all

lhe

agrcement or

olfAgreement

(h.tl

l find

thc: m will

produc~

r'(J1

knowl,dge,

<1.5

well ..s in

71l11lh~-

11/nli.:ai .pgun·/,

Thar which is requirite

m~ ke

our

kno\\'ledgc

aria;" ,

lhe

c1earnc.:fs of our

id~aJ :

alld Ihat

whid.,

is required

make

real,

¡s,

that

they

an(wcr

t heir

(1rChd)p~J.

7'hirdl;',

Uut the cl)mplex

id((u,

whieh

\Ve

rere r to

arcl'(hPU

without us, may differ fror... them. and fo ou r

Jcnowl edge about

lhcm

may come

Olon

of being rcal ;

anJ fueh ar< ou r

id,al

fubj/ancn.

Th"fe mu l! be ta–

ken frolll fornclh ing th.H does or has exillcd , and nOl be

nade up of

id(al

..rbitrarily put

logc:th~r,

Wlthout ;¡ny real

panero . H c:rein, thertfore, is fou nded the reality

ou r knowlcdge

cCJncerningjubjlanc(l .

that

all

our com o

id,al of

Ihem mu l! be fueh. anJ fu eh only, a. are

made up of fueh fimpl e ones as have been difeovered to

coexifi in nature. And our

id~al

beiog thus tI uc, tho'

not perhaps very exaél copies, are the fu bjeét:; of lhe

r(al

knowledge of them. Whatever

ideal

\Ve llave,

.rhe

agreemen t we 6nd [hey have with olhers

will

be know·

ledge.

thofe

id,al

be abllrAtl, it \ViII be

genaal

knowledge.

BU I lO

make

rall conce roingfuhj1ancu,

the

ideal

mu(l be taken from the real exillence of things.

'Vhercv~r,

therefore, we perceive lhe agretment or

dif~

agreement of our

i¿(al,

there is

cO lain lnowledge:

And whercTer \Ve are rure thore

íd~as

agree with lhe

reality of things, there is

cerlllin real

~fJo1JJledge.

/ru/h il1 genaal.

T RUTH. in Ihe proper impon of the \Vord. fign ifies

tbe joininR or feparaling of ligns, as the lhings fignified

by them do agree or difagree one with al1olher, The

j oioing or feparating of

{j~ ns,

is \Vhat \Ve

c~1I pr~/'?fi'

/i. 11I;

fo that

/rulh

properly bclongs only to

pr.p.¡ilion/:

Whercof there :lre twO fOrls,

menlal

and

verbal;

there are

I'UJO

fons of {jgns commonly

m.tde

ufc of,

tiras

and

'UJords.

difficult tO treat of

mental

propofitions \Vithout

l:erhal:

becaure, in fpc:\king of

I/ulllal,

\Ve mun make

ufe

ruJl)rds,

:lnd lhen they become

vc'rhal.

Ag~in ,

men

commonly in thei r thoughts and rearonings ufe

rwol'dJ

inaead of

ideal;

efl'eci.lly if the fubietl of Iheir medita–

t ion contains in it

c<;l/Ipl,.y ideal.

I fwe haveocca!ion

form

1/I(lIlal

propofiuons auout

-while,

Macl,

cire/e,

&c.

\Ve

can, and often do, fraOle in our rninds lhe

ideol

lhem·

(eh'es , wilhout rdlcéling on the

namo:

HUl

when we

\Vould conficicr, or make propofitioos about the more

COI/I'

I lex ideal,

11/al/, vilriol, forlilude, glory,

&c.

\Ve ufually puc lhe

I/OPlt

Cor

lhe

id~a:

uec3ufc:: the

idea

thefe

lJoJ/UJ

(hnd for being for the rooll par! confurt'd,

imperfd t, aod undett !mined,

\\'c

reOcé\. on

lhe

I/n1ll0

lh~mrclV(.s .

as b..:i ng more clea r, cenai n, and JiHina.

2r.d

reaJi t r tO occur

l O

!?'.r thoul!hts, th ilo plue

id((u;

anu fo we make ufe of Ihefe

'Wordl

infle,,! of Ihe

ideal

t hcrnrclvc!i, Cl't n whcn wc \\.'ould Olc:ditate and reafon

within

OUI

fdvcs, aDd makc tacit

11/0:141

prfJpojiliOI1I.

Vve muOrhen obfcrvo! two

forU

pn,/,o/tlio111

th at

;¡re cap.lble of mak,r.g :

Firfl .

/l/.

nlal fr4PVilionl,

\!tite

th~ jd~.11

OUI·

under nandíng~

are put logcther or

fepft ralcJ by lhe mind perctiv,nc or judging of lhci r a..

grcCOl(nt

(.Ir

dd~grecm~nt.

Scco'1d';', Verbalpropojilion¡;

wJlIch are words pUl together ur

fc.'pari!t~d

affl rmative

or ncgéi\l\'e tCOIences:

!:)u

that

p' o/"!iliJIJ

c<1nfiHs

join.

ing or fCpAT.'ting figns

41nd

Irulh

conlifls

putting to·

gether ur ft parating th('fc

fi~ns.

accordlOg

the thing!

they ROlnd

lor

agr~e

or dif"gree.

r ,.ulh,

wd l

kno ·\·Jédge. may well come under

the ddbnétion of

verb,d

and

r~nl;

that being only

v~r6QI

Irulh,

wherein tcrms are

joi n~d

according tO lhe agrt.e·

meO{ or d!fagreemt nt oCthe

id~al

they Hand for, wlthout

tegarding whelher our

idelll

are fu ch

really

have

are

capable

having

Olo

exifh nce

nAture. Hut then il

they cuntain

renl -,rulh.

when (hefe figos are joined 419

our

ideal

agree : and when our ideas are loch as, we know,

are capéible of h:wing ao exifience in nalure; which in fub.

nances we cannot know, but by knowing that (uch have

exiltc.::d.

rrulh

is lhe marking down io words the

a–

greement or dtfagrc:ement of

ideas

as it is:

Fnlfohood

the marklOg down in words the agreement or

difagree~

ment of

id~as

olherwife than it is; and fo for as there

id~Rs,

thus marked by founds, agree to {heir

nrch~IJPes.

fo fa r only i. Ihe

/rlllh

real.

The knowledge of ,hit

Irulh

confiOs in knowing what

id~al

the words Holnd for,

and the perceprion of the agreement or difagreement of

thoCe

ideal,

according as it is marktd by lhole \Yords.

Herides

Irulh

t.,ken io

lhe

llrilt fenfe before

m~ntioned,

there are other fons of

Irulhl:

As,

jirfl, ft'loral lrulh ;

whieh i, fpeaking 'hings aeeording

the perfuafion of our

own minds.

S.colldly.

fl1,/dph,[icJI

u/h

;

whieh i.

nothing bU( the real e:xiHc::oce of lhiogs conformable to

[he

ideas

to which

hAve aonexed fh clr n-imes.

There confide rations of

Irulh

en her ha viog been before

taken notice of, or not being mllch to our prerent pur·

paCe, il may fuffice here ooly to have menlloned thc:m.

Ollr

knowldg<

<xij/<nct .

HIT

E RT O

we have only conridered

the

~.ff~nceJ

things; which beingonly

ahflraO id,.as,

and thc.::reby re·

mO\led in our t houghts from p:J.'lIcular exiflence, give ut

no knowledge

e:ciflrnce

at a1l . VIe proceed no\\' to in·

quire concerning our

kno'tIJlulge

o.f

Ihe exijlence

of thing',

and ho\Y we come uy

it.

V'¡e have the knowledge of our

own

~xiJ1(n("~

iJllllition;

Ihr

~xijJalu

Cod.

d~lIIonjlralion ;

and of

olh~r

IhillgJ.

ftlJf nliolJ

As fo r our

own

t:.yiflenu,

we perceive ir fa plai nly, thae

neither

needs, nor is cap;¡ble of any proof.

Ihilll.,

renfon,

1fal pl!aJíIN and pain:

can aay of thefe be more e"iJent

tu me than my

own

exij1clIce

IC I doubt of

311

other

things,

d l3t

very

dOllht

m.,kes me

pf!Tc~j\'e

D'1Un

~xifl·

ence,

and wilJ not fufTa me tOdoubt of

,hou.

I f

know

doubt.

have as cen aín a perception of lhe

Ihin~

doubt·

ing. as of tha,

/f.ough/

whieh

cal!

d.llbl.

E xperi<nee

then convinces us, that we have 3n

inluilill( 1.IJo1.u/,

dge 01

Ollr own

exijJ~nce ;

and an internal infallibJe perceptíon

that we

arl"o

In cveryal} of fenfation, Tt'a(oning, or

thioking, we are confeious

Qurfd \'€s of our

OWD

being ;

and