216 / 868
"h
Ml:TAPHYS
e s,
cic.1 .rreAions ofbodies having no affini,y a< aH wi,h ,he
;d~4J
they produce in
US,
\Ve
CiJ,n
have no
diflina
know–
ledge of luch
openlion!
beyond
OUT
experience
j
Olnd can
rc;,¡Jon no
otherwire
abOlle them, than as the
effeéh
or
appointmcnt of Oln infi nitely
'UJifo
agtnt,
which
perfc\.'lj
y
furp3f, OUT
comprehenfions.
The opt.°ration of
QU T
minds upon
OUT
bodies, is as ín–
conceivOlble. H ow any
Ihought
fhould produce a .motian
in
bod)',
is as remole from
the
nature of OUT
¡¿(al,
as
ha," .ny
bcd)'
fhould produce any
IhotlgAI
in ,he
mind,
Th;u it is fa,
ir
experiencc did
nOl
confloce
us,
(he con–
fidera,ion of the things ,hemfelves would Dever be able
in rhe
lean
10
dircover
(O
uso
In fome of
OUT
id~I1J
there are certain rdadons, habi–
tudes, and conneétions, fa vifibly included in [he
Dature
of the
ideQJ
themfel\'f5,
thtlt we cannot conceive them
feparahlc from them by aoy power whal(oever: lo there
only we are capabh: of cen ain and univerCal knowledge.
Thus the
idea
ora
righl IifJfd
Iriang/~,
occe([arily car·
Ti~s
with
it
3n
u/ua/il)
of
¡,s anglu
lo Iwo
righl
onu.
But lhe coherence and continu i[y of lhe pan s of matter,
.he produélion of CenCalion in us of
coloun
and
foundl ,
&c. by impulfe and motion, being Cuch wherein we can
d,Ccover
no natural conneélion with any
ideas
we have,
we cannot but a{cribe them
tO
the arbitrary will and good
pleafure of the w.ife ArchiteA.
The things th>t we obferve conllaD,1y ' o proceed re·
gul. rly, we may eonelude 'o aA by a law fet ,hem; bOl
yet by a law that we know not; whereby. though cauCes
work lleadily, and e/feAs eonllantl y flo\V from them, yet
their conDedions and dependeocies being Dot diCcoTerablc
in
our
ideal,
we caD have but aD experimental kDowledge
of ¡hem,
The
I"ird
caure of ignorance,
is
our
1JJanl of Iracing
,hlJf~
ideas
'W~ hav~
or may ha\re, and findi ng out thore
imermédiate
id~as
which may {hew
us
whilt habi(ude of
agreement or diCagreement they may have one with ano–
th er: And (hus many are ignorant of
malhematica/
truths,
for want of application in inquiring. exami níng, and by
due ways comparing th ofe
id~ar.
Hitherto we haTe examined the
~x/~1JI
of our know·
ledge, iD refpeA of the fever.1 forts of beings tha< are:
T here is another
t xlenl
of
ir,
io refpeél. of
lwiverfalilJ,
which will aIro deCer.e to be conlidered ; aod io thís re ·
g. rd our knDwledge follo\Vs the nature of our
idUlJ.
If
the
id(ar
are
uhjlratl,
whofe agreement or d¡fagreement
we perceive, our koowledge ¡,
unif)~rfal.
For what ís
~nown
of fu ch general
id~as.
wiU be true of !!yery par·
tlcular thing in whích that
~nc~,
that ¡s,
ahJlra{}
id~a,
is
to be found: At:ld what is once known of fuch
ideas.
will
be perpt!lually, and for ever true.
So
that .
as
tO all
general knowledgc. we mufl fearch and liod
ir
onl y ín our
own minds : And it is only lhe examining of our own
i~
d~al
thar furnifh es os with that. T ruths belonging to
effences of things, (thoU ¡s,
to
a6jlrafl
ideas),
are
e·
lerna/,
and are
tO
ce found
OUt
by the contemph.tion only
of
thore elTt:nces, as Ihe exiflc:nce of things is to
be
knowa
only from expt:ric:nce.
O(
Ih, realil}
.¡
Ollr
<no'Wlerfge.
TM'
reaJer by thi, time may be reaJy 'o
obje~,
If
it be true,
thM.llknowlrdge li.. onl1 in ,he pereep,iotl
of the agrcemcot or J ifo/:greement of our own
id~al.
the
vi{ions of ao
enlhujiajl.
and the rearoDings of a
fog~r
man,
\ViII be
equally certain :
It
is no maner how things are.
fa
aman obferve but the agreemeot of his own im;,¡gina...
tions,
~nd
talk conform..
b~y
; it is all truth, aJl certai nty.
To this it is anCwercd, that if our knowledge of ou r
idetls
fhould termínate
in
lhem, and reacR
00
farthtr,
where thtre is Comething farth er ¡ntended, our moa
fC
4
rious thoughu would be of Jiule more ure thao the
r~verin ofa
crazy brai n. Bufit is evident. that this way
of
cerlain fy,
by the knowledge of our own
ideas,
goes
a li(tle fanher thao bare iruagination: and that all the
certainty of general truths
a
man has, líes in nothing eIre
bu' ,his knowledge of our
idM/ ,
le
is evident. that the mind knows not things immedi–
ately, but by lhe interveotion ofthe
id(as
it ha, of them.
Ou r knowledge thererore
is
r~al,
ooly fo far as there ¡s
a
conformity be(ween our
ideas
and the reality of things.
But how {hall we know when our
id~as
agree with thingi
themCelve, ? T here are
I~o
for's
of
ideal,
that we maJ
be affured agree with things: Thefe are,
Firf/,
Sim;/~ ide~s;
which lince the mind can
by
DO
mean. make 'o itfelf, mt111 be the e/fea of 'hing. ope–
rating upon the mind io a natural way, and producing
thereio thoCe perceptions, which, by the wiIJ of our
Maker, 'h ey are ordained .nd ad. pted 'o, H ence it ful–
lows, that
Jimp/e
id~as
are nOI fiélions of our fancies,
but lhe natural and regular produétions of things without
U5,
reaJly operatíng upon us; which carry with them
all
the conformity our {late requires
J
which ¡s tO reprefent
things under thofe appearances they are fjtted
te
produce
in us o Thus the
id~a
of
~hilent/s.
as it is in lhe mind,
exallly .n(wen tha< power whieh is in . ny body to pro–
duce it there . . And this conformity bet\t'een our
fiJJlp/~
ideas,
and the exicteoce of thingsJ
is
fuffi cieot for real
know1edge,
S<CMdly,
A ll our
(omplex
itlM/,
exeept ,hofe of fub–
flances, being
arch~/)'pes
of the mind's own m:!king. and
oot referred tO lhe exifience o f thi ngs as
tu
their ori ...
ginals, cannot want any conformity nece{fary to real
knowlcdge : For that wbich is not defi gned
10
repreCent
aey thing but ¡trelr, can neve,
be
capaqle of a wrong re..
prefentatioo. fl ere the
idfas
themfelvl::s are confidcn:d
as
arChrl}'pU,
and thinga no otherwife regardeá lhan as
they ::lre conformable to
theDl.
Thus the
1IJalh~III(1licialJ
confiders the truth
and
propenies belonging tOa
r~flunglt,
or
circf~,
uoly
as
they are
ideas
in his
0'''0
mind, which.
pofTibly he oevcr found exining mathem::ltica ll y, Ihat ¡s,
precifdy true; yet his
kno\~ledge
is nOl only cert;¡in, but
rea/;
becaufe re,tI things are no farther concnned , nor
¡ntended tO be me2nt by any Cuch
pr(lpo~itionsJ
[han
as
thiogs really agrce tO thoCe
archtl)'po
iD his mino .
It
is true of the
,dt'a
of a
Irínngll", Ihal ill Ihru
anglo
are
equa/lo I'UJO righl
Ol/tI:
It
is true
aIro or "
Iriat~~It,
wherever
it
~:'(Ifls:
W h.H is (fue of thoCe
ftgur'u
th.lth;:¡,ve bATely an
id(a/
exiHence in his mlOd, wdl hold {r\le
of thcm alCo wbcn they come
(O
ha\e
a
real
exdteoce in
r.
2tter.
H ence
it
follows, that
moral
knowledge is
as
carahJe
of
r(al
cerJainlJ'
as
l"alh(/II~/icG.l"
foc
t:rla;I/IJ
hping
nothJn~