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' 9%

M E T A P 11

equalily, Or the Ictn difr<rcoce,: Fur Ihore olher fiml'le

id~aJ

being

appcaranccs

or fenf...

tiolls

produceo in us

by

thefizc',

p):llre, 1IIf;liol/.

&c.

of

nl1nutc corpu(c1c.:s

I¡ngl y

¡nrcnliul~1

lheir ddfcrenl d(:grees' .110 depcnd un lhe

v,ui–

alion of fome, or al! of thale

\.au les; which

finte

jt

C30-

1l0l

be obfcned

by

us

in

p¡ullc1es of mau cr,

whercof each

y

e

s.

i. too ruoule to be

r"ce,,'~d,

it is impoffible ror us to

bal'e aoy exaa mearnrcs of Ihe differeot degrees of there

limpie:

it!t:.lJ .

Thus, for

iolt~nce,

not knowing

wh~t

number of particlcs,

Dor

whi\t motian

oC

them, is

r.t

lO

prouuce any precife degrec: of

r¡,uhi/~n~fi .

\Ve

cannal

dc–

monHratc (he

ccnain

cquali:y of any t\Vo degrees

oC 'Whi/e–

n~fi,

becaufe we have no cert aio

n.tnd ...

rd to meafure thcm

by, oor meaos

10

diflioguiOl every Ihe lean difFereoee ;

the ooly help we have oeiog from our Ceore" whicb in

this point fati us.

BUl where lhe

difference

is

lo

great

as to

produce

in

the mind

¡denl

clearly

dinint1: , thcre

ideal

of

colourJ,

as

wc

fee in dilferen¡ kind.,

bit"

and

ud,

(for inltance,)

~r~

c.pable of demonltralion

as

id,ol

of number and

cxtenCion. What is here

faid

of eolours, holds !rue in

• 11

fecondary qualities, Thefe

t\Yo then,

in/tu/ion

add

ilu1JonJlra/iofl.

are

the degrec:s of

ou r

lntJ<W/fdge;

what·

cver

com{s

fuort of

one of

thefe, is

bUl

failh

or

opinion,

not

~no'W/((Ig.,

.t lea!l, in aJl

gmera/lrUlhr.

There is,

indeed, anolher perception of Ihe mind employed . bout

the

par/hu/ar

~xif/enC(

of

fin ile beingl

without us;

wbich

going beyond probabililY, but not reaching

10

eitho< of

Ih,e foregoing degrees of cenainty, parres under ,the name

of

kM'W/. dg<,

Nothing can be more cenain, th.n Ihat the

id.a

we

rect:ive

fronl an external objeél: is in

our minds:

T his. is

;ntuilÍve l,;owledge

i

bU! whether we

can

thence

certain·

Iy infer the exi!lence of any thing wi,hout us, eorre(pond–

ing to that

idea,

is that

whereof fome men lhink there

may be a queflion made, beeauCe men may have ruch ao

idea

io

their minds, wheri

no fueh things exifl,

00

fuch

objetl a/feas their feoCes.

But ilS evideO! Ihat we are

iovincibly confciou!

lO

9urfclves of

a

different perception,

when we look "pon Ihe

[UI/

in Ihe day, aod Ihink on i,

by night ; when we aauaJly tane

'W. rlll1JJood,

or Cmell a

r(,fe,

or only

think

OR

that

fovour

or

odour.

So that ....

e.

may

~dd

10

the t\Vo former rOTtS of knowledge, this aIro

of Ihe cxiClenee of particular eXlernal objcas,

by

that

perceptíon

and confcioufneCs \'le

have

of

lhe

aé'lual entrance

of

id,al

from Ihem, and allow there Ih ree degrees of

knowledge,

viz. intuilive, danonjlrAtivf,

and

¡,:,yitive.

BUI lince our knowledge is founded on, and employed

aboul our

id,tll

enly, will i, follow thenec that il mul! be

conformable

tO

our

itltOf~'

and that

where

our

idC(1f

are

clear ano

dinintl,

oLfcure

and

confufed, there our kno\V–

ledge will be fo

100 '1

N o,

For our knowledge confiCling

in

the perception

of

lhe agreement. or

dir3gre~ment

of a1)y

two

ideal,

its

c1carncrs

or

obfcurny

con(jfls

10

,he

cle;u ·

neCs or obfeurilY of Ihat perecp,ion, and not in Ihe clear–

pers or obCeu,ilY of the

id,al

IhemCelves. Aman (for

in(l. nce) thal h:'s • clcar

idea

of Ihe angles of a tri'ngle,

and of I='luality

lO {WO

riCht

ones,

m:\y yet

ha\'e

bUl

an

obfcure

percepllon

o( their OIgreement ; and

fo

have but

a ..ry obfeur. knowledge of il. But oofcure and coo-

f"C<d

idrnl

can neVer prod"ce any cle.. or diOina kno",–

Icdge;

hec.lurc,

;¡S

(<Ir as any

idelll

are

obfcure

or con.

fl1feJ, (o f.t r lhe minu ca n

never

pcrceive cléarly whethcr

Ihey agr« or dil" llrec.

O[ Ih,

,xIU"

o[

hUlJJon

kM'W/.dg',

F flOM u.·hat has

beeo

raid cOllce.rning knowledge,

it

follo"'"

Fi,.jl,

That we c.n have no knowledge farlher

th;:m we h.tve

ide:u .

S,..

o?dly ,

T I", we have

0 0

knowlcdge farlher than We

can h.,,'e

perct..plion

of th:u agrecment

or

diragrecment

of

our

idt:aJ ,

eilher by

intuition, dCll1onjlralio1J

J

or

I(n–

fal ion.

7

hirdly ,

V.fc

cannot hav' an

Í1rlu;liv,

knowledgcth.t

(h. 1I eXlCnd ilCelf

10

aJl ou r

id<Ol,

and all that we would

know about

them,

bec:lU re \Ve

cannot'examine

and

per~

ce¡ve all [he

rehujors they

Ji,,\le one

to

another.

by

jllXta.

pofidon , or

30

immediate

comp~riron

one

with

aoother.

Tllus

\Ve

cannot

infTJi/ively

perceive the equaJity

of

[WO

extenfions,

Ihe dífference of

whofe

figures

makes

thiir

parts ¡ncapable of

30

ex~ét

immediatl!

applicatioo.

Fourlhly,

Our

raliona'

knowledge canDot reach

to

the:

whole exteOt of

our

¡¿(al;

becaufe between two

different

id(tol

we

\Yould examine.

we

Cjmnot always find

fuch

prooji

as we

cs.n conncl.'l:

one

to another,

with.

3D

in/u;.

liv.

~1/.'W/dg,

in all Ibe par.. of Ihe dedultion,

FiJlhly, S,njiriw

knowledge reaching no fanher tban

the oxi!lence of (hing. aau.aJly prercn'

10

our fenre" i.

)'et

much

narrOwer thao

either of the

former.

Sh.:Jhly,

FroDl

~II

which

it is evideol, that

the

e.'(ltnl

of

Dur

inO'UJI<dge,

comes nOI only OlOr< of the realily of

Ihillglt

but

even

of

lhe

eKteol

of oue

Qwn

ideal.

' Ve

have

t1~

ideal

of a

f quare,

a

circ/(,

and

equa/il)' ;

and

yet, perhaps, IhaJl never be able ' o find a

circle 'gua/ l'

a

[ quar<.

The affi

rmations

oc

negatioos

we

make conct!rning

the

¡d(al

we

hilve, being

reduced

tO

the

(our

fons above

mentioned .

viz. idenl;I)', cor:xif/enu, rdalion,

and

real

o :ijlenu,

we (hall exami ne how farou rknowledge extends

in eaeh of Ihe(e,

Firjl ,

As

tO

idenlil]

and

divu:JiI)',

our

intuitirte

11!o'W~

/eJge

is as far e:-aended as

our

ideal

thernf"lves;

aod

therc: c",n be

no

¡¿la

in (he.

miod. which

it

doe, not

pre~

femly, by an

j"rnitiv:

l.nf)

l'¡v/edgl,

perceived

tO

be

what

it is,

and

to

be

different from any othcr,

S<C011l/Iy,

As tO Ihe agre.ment or diCagreement of ou r

ideal

in

cOlxifler¡ce:

lo this our

knowl~dge

is

very

fhon ;

though in Ihis conr.!ls the greatdl and mol! malerial part

of ou r 'knowledge,

concerniog f llhJltrnco.

For our

ideal

of

fubjlanc<J

being nOlhing but

cert.in

col/, nianl o[fim–

p/t

'¡dens,

coexifling

in

one fubjefi,

(our

i¿fa

of

jlame,

'fo r

¡nnance, is a body

ho/, 11l11linouI,

and

11Iovin¡ up–

ttuard

,)

when we would know any

thing

fan:ler

con–

cerning this, or

any other fon of

fubOance,

what

do

\Ve

but

¡nquire what other qualitics or powers lhefe

fubflaD~

ces have, or ha,'e

not?

\oVhich is

norhing

d fe·bllt

(O

know what.

other fimp le

ideal

Jo or do

nut

co('xifl

with

IhoCe th..

m.ke

up Ihal compl«

id_a.

The reaCón of

Ihis ¡s. becaufe the Cimple

ir/<.nl

which make up our com–

plex

ideal

of fubltance" havo

00

vifiblc-ilece([,,,>,, con-

oeaioQ