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METAPtIVS

lhcrc be about

fc:plr:lte

rpi rits?

Let cunem from Ihe very

childhood

I~ave

joinc.:d figure <l nd

n\~pC

¡he

Ifa

of God ,

and what abfurcl.ties \ViII th.n nunJ be I....blc

abon.t

lhe D eity? L et the

i.f~n

i ll(.Jllibi/iIJ'

be jo,ned

any

perron, and {hert: {\Vo confiointly

togelher

poffl.:fs ,he

m ind

and then one body

iñ

{\Vo

pl.lces al

once flu ll be

fwallowcd for

cenain l.ruth, wheneyer that imagi ned in·

fallible Ferron di8ates, and d: mands afft'nt

Wilho'ut

in·

q uiry.

Sorne fu ch wrong combinations of

ideal

\ViII be found

eflablilb the irrcconcilcable oppo!ition bctwc:en dlfFerent

feas

philofophy 2nd religion: fo r \Ve

cannOl imagi ne

eve,y one of their followers

impofe wilfu lly on himfelf,

and knowingly refufe trmh ofTered by pl,i n reafon. In–

terell, though

does a great deal in

(he c::fe, yet cannot

b e thoughl tO \vork whole rocieties of men lO fo univcr–

fal a perverfenefs , as thal every one of lhem Ihould know–

ingly- maintain fallhood; fome al lean mun be allowed

'to do wh:.u all pre,tend

tal

to purrue trutlt fin cerely,

T~t

thereforc which captivate5 thcir rcafons, and Jeads

m en offincerity blindfold from common feofe, will, when

examined, be fouod

be whal we are fpeakillg of: fome

independent

.i¿eal,

are by education, cunom, and the

conllant dio of their party, fo coupled

their minds,

that they always appear thcre togetherj and they can no

more feparate ,hem in their

th~ughts,

than if rhey were

b ut one

idea

j and they operare as

they were fo, T his

gives fenfe to jargon, demonrlration to abCurdities, and

conGfieney tO nonCenfe, and is the foundation of the

greaten errors iD lhe world. The confur,on of two dif–

fcreat

ideal,

whieh a cufiomary conneélion of them

'ia

thei r

minrls

hath to them

effeét made but one, cannot

but

fiJl '

m,:ns helds with falfe views, and their reafonings

witb falfe eonfequenees .

~np'Wledge

in gemral .

S INCE

the mind,

in all

its thoughts and'reafonings, has

no other immediate objeét

b.ut

its own

ideol,

which alone

ir does dr can contemplate, it is evident that our kno\V–

ledge is only converfanl about lhem.

Knoowledge

then

reems to be nóthing but the perception of

Ihe

cCtnneétioo

and agreement,

difagreement and repugnancy of any

of our

ideal:

where this perceplion ¡s, there is

RIJO'W'

/u!ge ;

and where

nOI,

there, though

f¿ncy,

gu eCs, o r bclieve, yet

\Ve

always come filon 'of

RNOW –

Idge"

V/hen \Ve know that

'While

is not

black,

what do

\'le

but pcrecive that (here two

idedl

do not agrce ? O r

th~t

the lhree angles of

tritllJg/~,

areequal tOt\VO right

ones ; whal do we more but pl:::recive that equality to t\Vo

right ones docs nccelTarily agrce too and is ¡nreparable

from

th;

th ree angles of

triangle? BUl to undedland

tiHle more diflinétly wherei n this agreement or difagree–

meot con(jHs, \Ve may reduce it all to thefcfour

¡ortl:

dt.

fdenlil~

div,rjil];

2dly,

Rclali. ,,;

3dly,

e.–

exiJ1enct;

4thly,

Real exijlenu .

J .

U enlil]

diverjil].

1t i• •he firn aél of the

rnind ,

lo ptrceive

itl

ideas; and (o far as it pcrceives

Ihem, to know eaeh whac it is, and thcreby tO perceive

their differcncc, that is , the one not tO be the othcr :

this

the milld clearly

p~ rcei "es

eaeh

idea

a·

&.'ec Wilb itfel f, and to be wba! il is ; and .11 dillinét

I~al

tO dir.'gree. T his it doc.:; without any paios or de–

dllEtloR, by its n.Hural pO\Vt:r

p~rC':'I.Hlon

anJ ,Idbn!lion.

l 'h"

\V1t,\(

tU!:.n

art

hav..:

rcJu¡;~

...

lho(e general

ru les ,

viz . rtuhal

iJ,

an~J.

III/f 'i!fidr:/or Ihe

[.o/u

Ihing

and

1111

b~.

B UI

IIIf1XIlIt

can m;:¡ke

man k now

cleUlr, Ihat

roan.!

is out

fqJre.

thao the

bar~

perceplion of [hore two

,dro/,

whleh the nllnd

a.t

fi rn right pereeives to d,f.gree. .

The

ron

.agreeOle!lt or diragrecment

the

mind perceives in any of its

ideal,

moly be called

rtt/alive.

and is nothirlg but lhe pereeption of

the

relation between

any t\VO

iddal

of what kind foever; thílt

¡s,

their agree–

ment or

dtf~greeOlent

one Wilh ?notiJer in feveral way'

the

m~o~

takes of compatoing them .

3·

The third

ron

of a¿reement or d ifagreement to be

found

our ideas"

is,

c(;exijlel'lce

non-coexijl~u"e

the fame fubj eét; and this bdongs partieularly to fubCl.n–

ces. T hus wheo we pronouoce eoocerning

gold,

that

is hxed, it amounu tO no more bU[ lhis, that hxedllefs,

or a power tO remain io lhe' tire uoconrumed , is an

ial.'tf

that always aceompanies that particular fon of

)'~";'WI/CftJ

we{~IJt,

/uJibilily,

&c.

which rna:.te our

cOO1pl~x jd~a

r,gnified by the word

gold.

4. The fourth fort, is that of ·.élu,1 .nd

"ql

exijl.

ence

agreeing tO any

idea.

\Vithin there fou r rOrta

of agreement or difagreement, is contained aH the

knowledge we have, or are e.pable of. For all that we

know or can affir01 concerning aQy

idea,

¡s, That

¡s, or

is not the Carne with fome other; as, that

Mue

j¡

nol

.J~//0'W .'

That it <.loes, or does not cocxifi with another

the Carne fu bjeét¡

as,

that

ir~11

j¡

[ ufct:prib/e oí mOKn¡:·

tical imprrlfiolJJ;

Thal it has lhat or this relation to fome

olher

¡der.l;

as, That

I'UJOt riangln,

Uf0 '1

(flw l

ba/u

be.

l'WU I1

I'~o PQrall~",

are elJun/ :

or, that it has a real

exinence withou t the mind ; as,

Ihal

God

ÍI.

T here are leveral ",ay' wherein the mind is pofTeff<d

of truth, e¡tch of which is ealled knowledge.

Firjl,

T here is

o{]uallnDwlr:dge,

\Vhen

lhe

mind has

prefent

view of the agreement or difa greement of

any

of its

ideal.

or of the relation they have one wilh ano\,her.

S~cond~

Iy,

Aman is raid

kno\V any propolition, when haviog

once evidently perceived the agreement or difagreement

of (he

jdeal

whereof lt confifls, and fo lodped it io

hi~

memory, that whenever it comes to be rellc:é'ted

agaio,

the mind anents lO it without doubt or hcGtation, and is

cenaio of the trulh of

¡t.

And this may

caJled

hnbj~

.llla/llJ?rw/edge.

A nd thus aman may be faid tO know

a)) thofe truths 'wb eh are lodged in his memory by a fore–

goi ng, clear, and full percepuon.

habilual

~n.'Wledge

there are two fons: The one

\ is of fuch tTulhs

bid

up in the memory, as whcnever they

occur tO the mino, it aéluCilly perceives the reladon that

bet ween thore

id(fll,

~nd

this is in aJl thofe tf mlls,

where the

¡d(al

thcmfcl ...es, by an immediate view, diC",

cover thci r agrecmem or oifdgrcemCnt one with another.

The other is of fu eh truths, whereof lhe mind ha\'ing

been convinccd, it ret ains lh e mem.ory of the com'jétion.

without lhe proofs .

Thus aman that remembers ccr–

tainl y, that he once pcrteivc:d the demonClration, that the

Ihree angles

of a

tl ianglc are

eqtll l

to two right ones,

know9

true, when tholt dl:01ocrtratiOQ is gone

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