1000000031

T A P II Y S

e s.

",ithallt \\S, or dl:tt thcre are :w y

fini/~

j¡.¡riIJ,

or any

oth l!r

/pi,ilu:1i

b~il1gl

bm lhe

C'(rrlla!

God.

\Ve h

:l.YC

~round

(rom

rt T.·d"liC1J,

and

rcv~ral

othcr re;¡fons, to

lidil..ve

\l,lith

alTurancc , th:H (here are fuch crcatu res:

'BUl

our (,:ofes nO( being able to di (cover thcm, we

want rhe

Illt: ans

kno\Vlllg

their

p:nticuh r

exi(lence ;

Jor \Ve cnn no more kno\V that ¡here are

.I¡" i/~

[piril¡

real–

exiíling,

the

idt'ol

\Ve have of luch bcings, than

lhe

iJt'aJ

any one hi\S of

rai ,.io,

UIJl flUrJ.

he ca n

come to knbw, 1h3.1 thiuris anfwering (hoCe:

i rlt:(1J

do rrally

exill.

H ence \Ve may g:uhcr. lllat there are

Iw()

forfJ

propúlitions:

One

concerning

lhe exinencc

of any thing

ar1(wcr"blc to fuch an

idea,

lh:u

of 'ln

(/''/1'-0;1/ .

plrz-

11;.'(, 1I/orioll)

1IItg t!/)

viz.

whcthcr fl1ch

thing doe9

aoy whcre exitl: And thi'!: knowledgc: is on ly of

parlicu–

larI,

and not to be

h~d

of any.thing withour US, bUlonly

Cod,

any other

\v'y

than by ou r

fonfl.

AWJI!ur

Jo'

of propohtion is, wherein is exprc{fl.d the

agreement or

diragn.:em~ nt

of our

abjlrafl idetlJ,

and

their dependan.:e one

another. And lhefe may be

ur.iverj"I

and cen aio : (o h:lving the

iden

C od

and my

foif,

f ••

and

oh<t¡¡. na,

1 c.nnot bu t be fure that

C od

j¡

loóeflared

(llIrt

o"cJ'('d bJ' lIJe:

;1:I~d

this propofition will

be cert:\in concerning

mal!

in gcneral.

I ,have madc an

abJlr.-t{] idea

of fueh

aJP~ciu,

whereor

<1m

oncpal ticular.

But Cueh a propo(jeion

how certain Coever

proves not to

me the exiflence of

mt n

in che worlrl

but will be

tr.ue

of all (uch creature9, \\ henever thcX do exil1: wh ich

Ctr –

l uil1/y

of Cuch general propofi tions, dcpends on the :Jgre:e:–

ment or difagreement difcoverable in thofe

ohjlra{l ideaJ.

In che former cafe

our knowledge

¡s

the con(cquence: of

the

ex iflellce oí

Ihillgl '

producing

ideal

in ou r

minds by

our fC!nfes : -in the lat ter, the confcq uences of the

ideof

that

are in our mil/dI,

and produci ng theCe general pro·

pofitions, many whereaf are called

e/ern~

veri/a/eI:

and all of tAcm indeed are fo; not from being written al!

or any of them in the minds of

all

men, or that they \l/ere

any of them prapofi tions in any one:', mind, till

he,

having

gOt the

aójirall

idulI,

joined or fepa rated them by·;dn rm–

al ion or negatíon; byt wherefocve r we can furrafe fuch

Cre:a.ture

111011

is, endowed with fuch facolties, and

thereby furnifhed with fuch

i¿raJ

as we have, we mun

conclude he murt needs, when he applies his thoughts to

the confideration of his

irl~aJ"

know the tru rh of certain

propofitions that

will

ariCe: from the agreemcnt or difétgree–

ment he will pe:rceive in his own

ideoJ.

Such propo(j–

tion,· bl'ing once Olade about

oliflraD

id~aJ.

fa as

true, tlH=y will,

\~hene:ver

thl.'Y can be fuppofed to be

made again, al any time paf!. or to come, by a mind

having Iho(e

idl'aJ,

always be lrue: ror namC's

bti ns;

fup –

pofed

lt.nd

perpetually fo r the fame

ideal.

and the

fame

ideal

having i01mutably lhe {;'tOle habitudes one

acother, propo(jlions concerning any

o¡'flrp{l

ideal

that

are once true mufl nee:ds be

elt'rnal verilieJ.

Ofjudgll/ml.

T HE.

underflanding íacul/ieJ

being gíven to Olan, not

bardy for fpe culation, uut alfo for th e condllél

his life,

Ola"

would be al a great lo(s, if he had nothing tO di–

rtél h:ru Lut what has the cenainty

uue knowkd¡;e.

He ,hat wiU not

.al

till he has d emonllration that it will

nou rilh him, nor

jJir

{il!

he is infall ibly a{rurcd of (uc–

cl'fs in his bufinefs, \ViII Have little e1fc to do

butJíI

JliI/.

and pe"Jh.

Therefore as

Cod

hath fet fome things in broad

da)–

lighl;

;'ts he has given us (ome cenain knowlcdge, though

Jimilcd loa few thiogs

in comparifon, (probably

asa

taHe

of what

;lJlellcflual

crcatures

are

capable oro

excite

in us

de(jre and ende:wou r after a bcu er fhtc;) {o

the great ..

pan of ou r conce:rnment, Ile: has afforded

only

Ihe

1'U'ilighl

prob.hililJ,

fu itable to that Ilate of

m.di

.–

crilJ

and

probalionerJhip

he has been

ple~fed

pl.ce

here.

The faculty whi ch

Cod has

gil'en

/Han

to enligh,en him.

certa.in

knowlc:dge. is

judg ment;

whereby the

mind ta.kes

ils

ideal

agree or dl(;lgree, without

percei~

ing

ciemonHrative. evidence in the proofs.

The

mind

exercifcs this j udgment fomerimcs out of

neuJlily,

where

demonrlrati\'e proo(s

and certain

knowledge are not to

had; and fometimes out of

lazineji,

uofJdlfuloef" or

hane, even where che,. are lO

had o

This facu )¡y of lhe mind , when it

¡,

exercifed immed¡ ..

ately abom things,

called

utlgmcnl

when

about truths

delivered in words,

mol1 commonly called

affil1l

di[–

fin/.

Thus the: mind has

I'UJO

plcullie¡

conver{ant abou t

uuth and f. lfehood : Firll,

Kno"UJ/.dg.;

whereby it cer–

tainly perceive:s, and is undoubtedly fat is6c:d of the agree–

m<nt ur dif.greement of any ideas. Secondly,

Judg–

'llJeIl/ ,

which is lhe: putting

ideal

{Ogeth~r,

or (eparatio2

them from one another in the mind, when their cenain

agreement or difagreement

not

peruived,

bUI

prefu–

med to be be fo. And if it fo unites or feparates them a.

reality things are,

righf

judgmen/.

I",h.hilil).

PROBA 81 L T

is nothing bm the appearance ofthe agree–

ment or difagreement of t \YO

idea/

(he

intervention of

proors, who(e connetlion is nOI connant and immutable,

or is not

percei.ed

to be fo; bUI ¡s' or appears for the

moO: part

be: fo; and

enough tO induce lhe: mlOd to

judge the propo!ítion to be

tru<

falfo,

rather th,n the

contr:uy.

prohabililJ

there are degrees, from the neighbour–

hood of

cerlnin ly

and

de1lJonjlro/ion,

quite down

t O

im–

probaóililJ

aod

tmlikr/inifiJ

even to the con(¡Des of

impof –

JíhililJ :

And . Ifo degrees

~/Fh1

fro", « "ain kno\\"–

Jt'dge, and what

it,

full

a(fufdoce

and

confidence.

quite down to conjeéture, doubt, dil1run, and diíbelief.

That propofition then is

probal'le,

[or which there: are

arguments or proofs tO make

pa(s oro be rece:i \'ed for

I,.ue:

The entenainmeht the mind gives to this fort of

propofilior.s, is caIled

bclio/.

affin/

opinion.

Pro!Ja·

bililJ

then being to fup pl y the defeél of our knowledge.

always cooverfant about propofilions whercof we have

C"(rloin~y.

but ooly fome

induc~lIIenlJ

tO recei\'e theN

for, true. T he

ground:t

are, in {hart

Ib:fe

1'fJ.10

fol ..

lo\ving.

FirjJJ

T he

conforllJil)'of

any thing with our own know–

ledge, experirnce, or obfervation.

S(COIIJIy,

'T'he

Iif/im!.ny

of olhers, t'ouching thetr oh·

ferrati""

..w

rx=r;e.oc.e.

the

11Iim. ny

0['

othe" i.